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Subjects completed a baseline stimulus matching procedure designed to pro-
duce two symmetrical stimulus relations; A1–B1 and A2–B2. Using A1, B1, 
and two novel stimuli, subjects were then trained to produce a common key- 
press response for two stimuli and a second key- press response for two fur-
ther stimuli across two blocks of response training. During one block, the re-
inforcement contingencies were consistent with baseline relations (i.e., A1 and 
B1 shared a response function), whereas during the other block they were not. 
Thirteen of 18 subjects who completed the procedure showed a response class 
acquisition rate differential across the two test blocks in the predicted direc-
tion. It is suggested that this procedure may serve as a behavior analytic alter-
native to popular implicit tests. It provides a nonrelative measure of stimulus 
association strength and may display superior procedural implicitness over 
other tests.
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There has been considerable recent interest in developing behavior analytic 
“implicit” tests for assessing histories of relational responding and stimulus relations 
generally. This interest can be traced to the finding that the stimulus relations formed 
during a subject’s social history may interfere with the formation of novel stimulus 
relations, such as equivalence classes. Specifically, in what can now be surely described 
as a seminal study, Watt, Keenan, Barnes, and Cairns (1991) used a simple stimulus 
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equivalence paradigm to identify a history of religious sectarianism among Northern 
Irish and english subjects. These researchers took advantage of the fact that people in 
Northern Ireland often respond to names as indicative of social and religious background. 
They suspected that well- established stimulus relations between real- word stimuli might 
interfere with the acquisition of relationally incongruous stimulus equivalence classes.
In the Watt et al. (1991) study, subjects were first exposed to a matching- to- sample 
(MTS) procedure, in which A–B relations were trained between Catholic surnames and 
nonsense syllables, followed by B–C training between the nonsense syllables and 
Protestant symbols, leading to derived A–B–C equivalence classes. During equivalence 
testing, english subjects correctly matched the Catholic names with the Protestant 
symbols (i.e., derived A–C relations), but 12 of 19 Northern Irish subjects chose a novel 
Protestant name in the presence of the Protestant symbols, thereby failing to demonstrate 
the normally predictable stimulus equivalence classes. These findings suggested that the 
social contingencies operating in Northern Ireland interfered with the establishment of 
equivalence relations in the laboratory. In simple terms, the derived equivalence testing 
procedure required Northern Irish subjects to juxtapose names and symbols in a manner 
that was counter cultural. The outcome of this study laid the groundwork for a behavior 
analytic test that might allow researchers to tap into stimulus relations, the derivation or 
discrimination of which has been supported by the appropriate contingencies but which 
has not in fact yet been derived or discriminated. It might also allow researchers to 
assess specific relations between stimuli, without alerting subjects to the point of the 
test. In other words, the test was shown to be capable of identifying stimulus relations 
implicit in the social history of a subject while at the same time circumventing the need 
for direct questioning and the associated demand characteristics (i.e., social desirability; 
see Paulhus, 2002).
The Watt et al. (1991) procedure certainly captured the attention of behavior 
analysts, who have used the methodology extensively. Dixon, Rehfeldt, Zlomke, and 
Robinson (2006) found that the Watt et al. (1991) method could be used to measure the 
social discrimination of Middle- Eastern people. In a study on gender identity, Moxon, 
Keenan, and Hine (1993) found that subjects had more difficulty forming equivalence 
classes when the classes included female names and stereotypic male occupations (see 
also Kohlenberg, Hayes, & Hayes, 1991; Roche & Barnes, 1996). In another study, 
Leslie et al. (1993) demonstrated that anxious subjects had difficulty in matching 
pleasant- state adjectives to stimuli representing threatening situations in a stimulus 
equivalence test. Barnes, lawlor, Smeets, and Roche (1995) employed the Watt et al. 
(1991) paradigm to examine the formation of stimulus equivalence relations between 
positive and negative words and subjects’ own names (see also Merwin & Wilson, 2005). 
McGlinchey, Keenan, and Dillenburger (2000) harnessed the stimulus equivalence test 
paradigm in developing a method to identify the presence of child sexual abuse among 
children. Finally, Roche, Ruiz, O’Riordan, and Hand (2005) also reported on the use of 
the Watt et al. (1991) paradigm in a pilot study that attempted to distinguish child sex 
offenders from a sample of control subjects.
The foregoing studies all provided promise that the Watt et al. (1991) method could 
be harnessed to produce subtle tests for social and other sensitive stimulus relations that 
may not be easily measurable using explicit self- report methodologies, such as paper- 
and- pencil tests. However, these studies all involved the use of real words as stimuli and 
relied upon speculation about the types of stimulus relations that already existed in the 
social histories of the subjects. What was needed was a dedicated laboratory controlled 
analysis of the Watt et al. process, using arbitrary stimuli whose functions were under 
experimental control.
The first study to attempt such an analysis was conducted by Roche, Barnes, and Smeets 
(1997; Experiment 2). The authors paired two nonsense syllable stimuli (A1 and C2) with 
sexually arousing film clips and two other stimuli (A2 and C1) with nonsexual film clips. 
The A1–C2 and A2–C1 relations were then tested using a matching- to- sample test. 
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The experimenters then trained subjects on a matching- to- sample procedure that was 
designed to lead to the emergence of two 3-member equivalence classes among nonsense 
syllable stimuli, including the conditioned sexual and nonsexual stimuli. The emergent 
relations were each intended to contain one conditioned sexual and one conditioned 
nonsexual stimulus. In other words, the emergent equivalence relations (e.g., A1–B1–C1) 
would be incongruous with the previously established functional classes (e.g., A1–C2). 
When reexposed to the matching- to- sample testing, subjects matched stimuli based on 
their conditioned sexual/nonsexual functions rather than forming the equivalence 
classes predicted by the MTS procedure. This demonstrated that the emergence of 
stimulus equivalence can be impeded by the existence of incongruous stimulus relations. 
This research, therefore, corroborated the Watt et al. (1991) suggestion that stimulus 
equivalence tests can be used as tests for the existence of previously established stimulus 
relations in socially sensitive contexts (i.e., in which direct questioning of a subject is 
inappropriate or ineffective; see also Hall, Mitchell, Graham, & lavis, 2003; Tyndall, 
Roche, & James, 2004, 2009, for related studies).
While the Watt et al. (1991) procedure has proven to be of considerable interest to 
behavior analysts, it has not been adopted widely as a testing methodology in the world 
outside the laboratory or by psychologists in mainstream psychology, as have several 
popular “implicit” tests, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the emotional Stroop (see Williams, Mathews, & 
Macleod, 1996, for a review). We offer three main reasons why this is the case. First, 
the Watt et al. stimulus equivalence paradigm requires an understanding of the 
stimulus equivalence phenomenon and the conditional discrimination training 
methodology with which it is usually associated. Thus, it is not easily accessible to 
non–behavior analysts. Second, the test format is very demanding of subjects insofar 
as that it requires considerable attention and motivation in order to complete training 
and testing phases of the procedure. Finally, the test format requires considerable time 
compared to other popular implicit tests, such as the IAT or emotional Stroop. While 
the latter typically requires only a few minutes, the stimulus equivalence methodology 
requires approximately 20 minutes to complete.
Another potential shortcoming of the Watt et al. (1991) procedure is one that may 
compromise its subtlety. Specifically, in this procedure, two incompatible stimuli are 
presented together as sample and comparison, respectively. While a subject has no way of 
being certain what the purpose of the measure is, the fact remains that the stimuli whose 
relation is under analysis are presented simultaneously during the testing phase. Thus, 
procedural implicitness is compromised by the Watt et al. technique. Procedural implicitness 
refers to the degree to which the relations under analysis and the purpose of the test are 
discriminable by a subject. This is to be distinguished from outcome implicitness, which 
refers to the implicitness of the stimulus associations being measured (i.e., whether the 
subject has ever discriminated the associations in the past; see De Houwer, 2006).
An important but simple modification can retain the basic core process of the Watt 
et al. methodology while at the same time disguising the purpose of the test more fully. 
More specifically, if we attempt to establish a functional response class instead of a 
derived equivalence relation, an entirely novel test format presents itself. That is, instead 
of presenting the two stimuli of interest simultaneously to assess the probability of a 
matching response during an equivalence test, it is possible to present the stimuli 
individually on separate trials and attempt to establish a functional stimulus class 
containing them. This can be done by establishing distinct response functions for stimuli 
that are suspected of being related as a result of prior social interaction. The rate at 
which a subject learns to produce the common response for both of these stimuli, 
presented separately, can be compared to the learning rate for producing distinct 
responses for these two stimuli, again across separate trials. Such a procedure requires 
no conditional discrimination training, is not demanding on the subject (i.e., there are no 
relations to derive), and is fast to administer.
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As an example of the foregoing, we might assess whether or not the words 
mathematics and fun are related for a sample of school children with difficulty learning 
math. We could present them with each of four stimuli, individually and in a random 
order, and across several re- cycled blocks of trials. The stimuli should consist of the 
words of interest (mathematics and fun) and also two novel and entirely unrelated words; 
nonsense syllables may work best. upon the presentation of each stimulus, the subject 
may be required to produce one of two responses. These responses may be positional on 
a computer keyboard or may involve clicking on a specific discriminated response key 
on a computer screen. Correct responses can be easily reinforced verbally or with tokens. 
It is important that the words of interest share a common response, while the novel 
control stimuli (e.g., nonsense syllables) also share the remaining response function. The 
number of trials required for the subject to reach a preset fluency criterion in this block 
of trials represents an index of the preexisting strength of the relation between the words 
mathematics and fun.
We may also rerun the test block, but with the important difference that now we 
establish a response class for the word mathematics and one of the control words. 
Similarly, the word fun and the remaining control word now share a response. If the 
words mathematics and fun have been related in the history of the subject, then this 
latter task block will require a larger number of training trials than the former block 
described above, simply because the latter task is inconsistent with the social history of 
the subject (i.e., the functional class is inconsistent with the socially established 
functional or equivalence class containing the words mathematics and fun). A baseline 
rate of acquisition of response classes using novel and arbitrarily chosen stimuli may 
also be recorded. We may then assess the extent of the facilitating or retarding effect of 
preexisting stimulus relations between mathematics and fun on learning during the two 
test blocks. Taken together, this approach to assessing the strength of a stimulus–
stimulus relation can be referred to as a Function Acquisition Speed Test (FAST).
The rationale underlying the FAST format is not unlike that used by researchers 
studying resistance to change effects. Nevin and Grace (2000) described this effect 
using the concept of behavioral momentum. They suggest that momentum describes rate 
of responding, which is analogous to the velocity of a physical body in motion under 
Newtonian physics. When high- rate stable behavior is disrupted in some way by a 
change in contingency, we see effects that are analogous to the inertial mass of a physical 
body in motion. That is, behavior (or movement) continues on the original trajectory, and 
current contingencies are less effective than they would be if current behavior was low 
in momentum. In a representative experiment, Nevin (1974, Experiment 1) trained 
pigeons on multiple VI 1-minute (Component 1) and VI 3-minute schedules 
(Component 2). Once behavior was stable, a disruptor in the form of “time out” food 
between components was introduced. Rates of responding were higher preceding the 
presentation of the disrupter, and the decrease in response rate was smaller in 
Component 1 compared to Component 2. In such studies, the disrupting effect is 
typically quantified by calculating the proportion of responding under the novel 
contingency compared to baseline rates. logarithmic transformations of this proportion 
are also usually applied. This index is then used as an index of strength of responding 
given a particular stimulus, a technique which can also be usefully applied to the FAST 
procedure.
The FAST methodology also has much in common with the widely used IAT (see 
Gavin, Roche, & Ruiz, 2008; Gavin, Roche, Ruiz, Hogan, & O’Reilly, 2012; Ridgeway, 
Roche, Gavin, & Ruiz, 2010; Roche et al., 2005). The IAT was originally said to measure 
“implicit” attitudes or beliefs, while preventing subjects from exerting conscious control 
over the test outcomes (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001; Kim, 2003). A guiding but theory- 
uncommitted assumption of the IAT (see Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji, & Klauer, 2005) is 
that it is easier to assign a single response to two concepts if they are associated in 
memory than if they are unrelated.
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One early IAT study (Greenwald et al., 1998) involved presenting subjects with 
flower names (e.g., TULIP) insect names (e.g., SPIDER), pleasant words (e.g., LOVE) or 
unpleasant words (e.g., uGly) individually, on separate trials. Subjects were asked to 
categorize the names by means of one of two positional key presses. In the first 
(consistent) condition, the same response key was assigned to both flower and pleasant 
stimulus words, while insects and unpleasant word stimuli shared a different but 
common positional response. In the second (inconsistent) condition, one response key 
was assigned to unpleasant words and flower stimuli, and the other to pleasant words and 
insect stimuli. The researchers found that reaction times were shorter for associated 
stimuli (i.e., the consistent condition) than for nonassociated stimuli (i.e., the inconsistent 
condition.). This, in essence, is the IAT effect. Typically, the reaction time differential 
rather than the response accuracy differential across the two conditions is used as a 
measure of differences in the strength of stimulus associations. Social  cognitivists use 
the existence of these IAT effects to draw inferences about unconscious cognitive 
activity or hidden prejudices and beliefs.
The IAT has become a favorite instrument of social-cognitive researchers interested 
in studying attitudes, due to its claims of being resistant to intentional deception by 
subjects and its ability to measure attitudes of which subjects themselves may not be 
conscious. However, it has also been met with several criticisms. Most of these criticisms 
are concerned with the ambiguity of its terminology, the nature of its scoring process 
(e.g., De Houwer, 2006; Fiedler, Messner, & Bluemke, 2006; Govan, & Williams, 2004; 
Karpinski, & Hilton, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2003; Rothermund & Wentura, 2004; Steffens 
& Plewe, 2001) and its use of statistical inference (see also Blanton & Jaccard, 2006). 
Others have provided evidence that participants can intentionally influence IAT effects 
(e.g., De Houwer, Beckers & Moors, 2007; Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005; see also Nosek & 
Banaji, 2001 for a review).
unsurprisingly, behavior analysts have also critiqued the IAT’s use of mentalisms 
and poorly understood stimulus control procedures (see Gavin et al., 2008; Gavin 
et al., in press; Roche et al., 2005; Ridgeway, et al., 2010). A behavioral model of the 
IAT was offered by Roche et al. (2005) and was later tested empirically by Gavin et al. 
(2008) and Ridgeway et al. (2010). According to this model, the IAT works by 
measuring the ease with which common response functions can be established for 
exemplars from different verbal categories (e.g., African American and Good). It also 
compares the accuracy and speed of responding in the acquisition of these common 
functions with those recorded for the establishment of incompatible response functions 
for members of the same verbal categories (e.g., European and Good; see also O’Toole 
& Barnes- Holmes, 2007).
The behavioral model of the IAT is critical of several features of the IAT 
presentation format, and it is important that we briefly outline some of these concerns 
because these are all addressed and improved upon in the FAST format outlined in the 
current study. First, in the experimental analysis of behavior, reaction times alone are 
not typically treated as indicative of the strength or stability of any instance of behavior. 
Instead, response accuracy or fluency (combined accuracy and speed) measures are 
usually used for this purpose. The FAST, therefore, relies on a fluency- type measure—
the number of successive correct responses produced on trials during which a strictly 
limited response window is enforced. This reliance upon fluency over response time also 
circumvents several problems regarding the manner in which response times are 
calculated using the IAT (see Gavin et al., 2012, and Ridgeway et al., 2010, for detailed 
critiques).
Second, the putative feedback presented during the IAT may in fact function as a 
form of punishment. Subjects are informed only when erroneous responses are produced, 
by the presentation of a red X on screen. No feedback is provided following correct 
responses. This is a less than efficient way to establish response fluency, and the delivery 
of punishment has unknown effects on subsequent responses and response rates. This 
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imbalanced feedback procedure makes the emergence of IAT effects more likely, but for 
reasons not clarified by its inventors. More specifically, this procedure ensures that 
whichever of the two test blocks contains fewer errors (the relationally inconsistent 
block) will also be the block that involves less punishment, therefore possibly 
exaggerating the accuracy and reaction time differences across blocks in the expected 
direction. This exaggeration may occur because rapid responding in the consistent block 
is negatively reinforced by the removal of both interruptions to response fluency and the 
omission or reduction of negative feedback. In contrast, rapid responding in the 
inconsistent block is punished, thereby leading to slower responding. Previous research 
has shown that response caution during difficult IAT tasks can partially explain IAT 
effects (Klauer, Voss, Schmitz, & Teige- Mocigemba, 2007). We would suggest that 
imbalanced and negative feedback during the IAT produces precisely such imbalanced 
response caution. Therefore, in the current FAST procedure, feedback follows both 
correct and incorrect responses.
Third, the most popular IAT scoring technique (D- algorithm; Greenwald, Nosek, & 
Banaji, 2003) involves a standardized reaction times measure (taken across a fixed trial 
block) as the core index of association strength (or what we would call stimulus relation 
strength). However, the trajectories of reaction times across trials are not assessed, and 
response rates and changes in rate are usually irrelevant to the measures (see also 
Blanton & Jaccard, 2006). In line with behavior analytic tradition, the FAST format 
measures learning rates to predetermined criteria (i.e., block lengths will vary across 
subjects) and takes learning rate as the primary behavioral measure over standardized 
latency scores.
Fourth, the IAT’s scoring method involves data cut- off points and subject 
elimination procedures designed to stabilize data and increase statistical significance in 
subsequent analyses. Thus, the scoring method is psychometric in style, insofar as 
psychometrics involves the creation of data stability through means other than improved 
stimulus control. In contrast, the stability of subjects’ behavior during the FAST will be 
enhanced across research studies using methods designed to improve experimental 
control over response variability, the analysis of which is an important part of our 
subject matter (Sidman, 1960).
The current FAST procedure emerged directly from research into developing 
functional IAT variants within the experimental analysis of behavior literature (e.g., 
Gavin et al. 2008; Gavin et al., 2012; Ridgeway et al., 2010). However, we should point 
out that one other behavior analytic alternative to the IAT has also been developed in 
parallel (i.e., the implicit relational assessment procedure; see Barnes- Holmes, Barnes- 
Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010). We will consider this test format and its relevance to 
the current FAST procedure in the Discussion.
The current study involved the examination of the Function Acquisition Speed Test 
(FAST) procedure for assessing the existence and strength of laboratory controlled 
stimulus relations. It uses as its core index the rate at which a simple functional class can 
be established (i.e., the number of training trials required to produce a functional 
response class at a given level of fluency). More specifically, in the current experiment, 
subjects will be exposed to a matching- to- sample procedure in which relations between 
nonsense syllables will be established (i.e., A1–B1, A2–B2; Phase 1). Next, subjects will 
complete a testing procedure consisting of three phases. Two of these phases will be 
baseline phases that will measure the number of training trials required to establish 
simple discrimination response classes when the two discriminative stimuli involved are 
novel and previously unrelated (i.e., Phases 2 and 4). Phase 3 will consist of two testing 
blocks. The first block will measure the rate at which two response classes can be 
established when the discriminative stimuli participating in one of the functional 
stimulus classes are already previously related as a result of the matching- to- sample 
training (i.e., A1 and B1 will share common response functions). The second block will 
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measure the acquisition rate for two response classes that are orthogonal to the trained 
stimulus–stimulus relations (i.e., A1 and B1 will not share common response functions). 
The learning rates observed for these two blocks will then be compared to each other and 
the baseline acquisition rates (using entirely novel and unrelated stimuli) to determine if 
the resulting FAST indices are sensitive to the preexisting stimulus relations.
method
subjects
Twenty- one volunteers participated in the study as subjects. Three were eliminated 
due to their performance during the FAST or the baseline blocks (see Results). Of the 18 
remaining volunteers, 6 were male and 12 were female. Ages ranged from 19 to 36 years 
(M = 22.94, SD = 3.72). The subjects were recruited both from acquaintances of the 
experimenter and using a “snowballing” technique whereby subjects were asked to recruit 
a further subject for participation. Informed consent was obtained in writing from all 
subjects.
Apparatus
All phases of the experiment were presented to subjects on an Apple MacBook laptop 
computer with a 13-inch monitor (1024 × 768 pixel resolution). Stimulus presentations 
were controlled by the software package Psyscope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 
1993), which also recorded all responses. Stimuli consisted of 14 nonsense syllables (ter, 
lar, jum, mip, ler, mau, hox, yun, pim, kon, geq, kav, zuv, jin), randomly assigned to their 
roles as samples, comparisons, and FAST stimuli (see below). These will be referred to in 
future using alphanumerics.
general experimental procedure
The experiment consisted of four phases. Phase 1 (stimulus matching procedure) 
required approximately 8 minutes to complete. Each of the four subsequent function 
training blocks (Phases 2–4) typically required 2 to 4 minutes to complete. Phases 2 and 4 
each consisted of exposure to a single block of baseline function acquisition training, 
employing novel nonsense stimuli. Phase 3 involved the presentation of the FAST. This 
consisted of two blocks; a block testing for the speed of acquisition of a functional response 
class containing related stimuli (i.e., a “consistent” test block), and a block testing for the 
speed of acquisition of a functional response class containing stimuli from distinct 
stimulus relations (i.e., an “inconsistent” test block). There was a maximum of 100 trials 
presented for all baseline and FAST blocks. Subjects who could not reach criterion within 
this limit were excluded from the study. Three subjects were eliminated on this basis (see 
Results).
All phases were presented consecutively by the computer software, which also 
controlled the delivery of instructions at the beginning of each phase. Subjects sat 
comfortably at a standard computer desk and viewed the computer screen at a distance of 
approximately 60 to 70 cm and at eye level.
Phase 1: Matching- to- sample training. In this first phase, subjects were exposed to 
four matching- to- sample training tasks, each designed to establish two simple stimulus 
relations. The relations trained were: choose B1, not B2, when A1 is present; choose B2, 
not B1, when A2 is present, choose A1, not A2, when B1 is present; and choose A2, not 
A1, when B2 is present (see Figure 1). The purpose of this phase was to establish two 
laboratory controlled stimulus relations that could be employed to assess the utility of the 
FAST in determining the existence and strength of stimulus relations established during 
Phase 1.
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A1
B1 B2
A2
B1 B2
B1
A1 A2
B2
A1 A2
Figure 1. The stimulus relations trained during Phase 1. Solid lines indicate reinforced matching 
responses.
Subjects were presented with the following instructions at the onset of Phase 1:
In a moment, some words will appear on this screen. your task is to look at 
the word at the top of the screen and choose one of the two words at the 
bottom of the screen by “clicking” on it using the computer mouse and 
cursor. During this stage, the computer will provide you with feedback on 
your performance. you should try to get as many answers correct as possible. 
If you have any questions, please ask them now. When you are ready, please 
click the mouse button.
All trials were presented on the computer screen against a white background. A trial 
began with the presentation of the sample stimulus at the top center of the screen in 
black 24-point font. One second later, the two comparison stimuli were displayed in black 
24-point font in the bottom left and right corners of the screen (see Figure 1). The positions 
of the comparison stimuli were counterbalanced across trials. All stimuli remained 
onscreen until the subject responded by clicking on one of the comparison stimuli using 
the computer mouse and cursor. Immediately upon a response, the screen cleared and 
corrective feedback (“Correct” or “Wrong” in red 48-point font) appeared in the center of 
the screen for 1.5 s. Trials were presented in blocks of 32 (i.e., each of the four trials 
presented eight times). Subjects were required to complete successive training blocks until 
a criterion of 31 or 32 correct responses in a single 32-trial block was met (i.e., 96.9% 
correct).
Phases 2, 3, and 4 comprised the full FAST procedure, which included two baseline 
phases (Phases 2 and 4) and a test phase (Phase 3), which in turn consisted of both a 
consistent and inconsistent test block. For clarity, we will describe the Phase 3 test 
blocks first.
Phase 3: Function Acquisition Speed Test. In this phase, subjects were exposed to 
the two- block FAST using the A1 and B1 stimuli from Phase 1 and two further novel 
nonsense syllable stimuli, N1 and N2. One of these blocks (the consistent block) established 
two functional stimulus classes (A1–B1 and N1–N2) that were consistent with the 
stimulus–stimulus relations established in Phase 1 (i.e., in which A1 was matched with 
B1). The other block (inconsistent) established two functional stimulus classes (A1–N1 and 
B1–N2) that were inconsistent with the relations established in Phase 1. Figure 2, middle 
panel, illustrates the tasks involved in each block. The order of the consistent and 
inconsistent blocks was randomized across subjects.
Subjects were presented with the following instructions at the onset of each FAST 
block:
In the following section, your task is to learn which button to press when a 
word appears on screen. IMPORTANT: During this phase you should press 
only the A key or the J key. Please locate them on the keyboard now. This 
part of the experiment will continue until you have learned the task and can 
respond without error. To help you learn, you will be provided with feedback 
telling you if you are right or wrong. If you have any questions, please ask 
the researcher now. Press any key when you are ready to begin.
515FuNCTION ACquISITION SPeeD TeST
Baseline 1
Baseline 2
Consistent Block Inconsistent Block
X1
X3
A1 A1
Y1
Y3
N1 B1
X2
X4
B1 N1
Y2
Y4
N2 N2
Press Z
Press Z
Press A Press A
Press M
Press M
Press J Press J
Figure 2. A schematic of the various response functions assigned to stimuli during baseline 
and FAST blocks. The three panels, read from top to bottom, also represent the sequence of 
presentation of the two baselines blocks and the two FAST blocks.
All trials were presented on the computer screen with a white background. A trial 
began with the presentation of one of four nonsense syllable stimuli (A1, B1, N1, N2) in the 
center of the screen in 48-point black font. The stimuli remained on- screen for a period of 
3 s or until a response was emitted (i.e., a 3 s response window was enforced). each of the 
four stimuli was presented in a quasirandom order in blocks of four trials (i.e., no more 
than two consecutive exposures to any one stimulus was possible).
Immediately upon the production of a response, corrective feedback was presented (i.e. 
either “Correct” or “Wrong” presented in red 48-point font in the center of the screen for 
1.5 s). If no response was emitted within the 3 s response window, an incorrect response was 
recorded, but no feedback was provided. In that case, the subsequent trial began immediately 
upon the end of the 3 s response window. Subjects were exposed to trials until 10 consecutive 
correct responses were produced. A predetermined limit of 100 trials was enforced because 
pilot research had indicated that once this limit was reached, the subject was unlikely to 
complete the block before giving up or being asked to cease by the experimenter.
In summary, the FAST blocks attempted to establish two response classes under two 
conditions; one in which previously related stimuli participated in the same functional 
stimulus class, and one under which they participated in distinct functional stimulus 
classes.
Phases 2 and 4: Baseline function acquisition rates. This purpose of these phases 
was to establish a baseline level of response class acquisition using novel and unrelated 
stimuli against which acquisition rates with target stimuli could be compared. The 
procedure used during these two phases was identical to that employed during the critical 
FAST blocks (Phase 3). However, only one block was provided in each phase. In addition, 
different response keys (Z and M) were employed during baseline phases in order to 
prevent any conflicting response histories across baseline and critical FAST phases.
Two baseline phases were presented (one before and one following the FAST; Phase 2 
and 4, respectively) in order to assess the stability of baseline rates of function acquisition 
across time. Administering two baseline phases also had the advantage that it would allow 
516 O’ReIlly eT Al.
for the calculation of a mean baseline acquisition rate if baseline performances proved to 
be unstable across time (see Results). Figure 2 (top and bottom panel) illustrates the tasks 
involved. The following instructions were delivered at the start of each baseline phase:
In the following section, your task is to learn which button to press when a 
word appears on screen. IMPORTANT: During this phase, you should press 
only the Z key or the M key. Please locate them on the keyboard now. This 
part of the experiment will continue until you have learned the task and can 
respond without error. To help you learn, you will be provided with feedback 
telling you if you are right or wrong. If you have any questions, please ask 
the researcher now. Press any key when you are ready to begin.
The two baseline blocks involved novel and unique stimuli. Phase 2 employed X1, 
X2, y1, y2 as stimuli while Phase 4 employed X3, X4, y3, y4 as stimuli. These phases 
attempted to establish the following relations, respectively: X1–y1, X2–y2 and X3–y3, 
X4–y4.
Results
Of the 21 volunteers who completed the experimental procedure, the performances of 
three subjects were not included in the data analysis. Specifically, Subjects 2 and 6 were 
eliminated on the basis that they failed to reach response fluency on one of the baseline 
blocks within 100 trials. Subject 8 failed to reach the fluency criterion on one of the FAST 
blocks (the consistent block).
matching- to- sample Training
All subjects successfully completed matching- to- sample training. The average number 
of training trials needed to reach the criterion (97% correct) was 65.61. Table 1 illustrates 
the training requirements for each subject.
Table 1
Number of Trials Required to Complete Matching-to-Sample Training (Phase 1)
Subject 1 3 4 5 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
No. of Trials 64 32 32 32 128 32 96 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 128 32 64 96
Baseline Blocks
Table 2 shows the number of trials required by each subject to reach the fluency 
criterion (10 correct responses in a row without error) for each baseline block (Phases 2 
and 4). These data illustrate what appears to be large variation in performance from the 
first to the second baseline block. Upon close inspection, however, this variation would not 
appear to be consistent, and cannot therefore be considered a practice effect. A Wilcoxon 
signed ranks tests found the difference in trial requirements across the two baseline blocks 
to be nonsignificant (z = −1.198, p = .231, two- tailed). Given the within- subject variability 
in performance across the baseline blocks, the researchers calculated the mean number of 
trials to criterion across both baseline blocks for each subject. They then used this figure as 
the baseline acquisition rate against which to compare FAST block acquisition rates.
Table 2
Number of Baseline Trials Required to Reach the Fluency Criterion Across Both Baselines 
(Phases 2 & 4)
Subject 1 3 4 5 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Baseline 1 26 84 12 41 40 27 42 70 24 88 20 48 66 21 35 49 20 12
Baseline 2 31 26 10 15 48 12 12 12 100 31 58 30 16 12 24 58 59 21
Mean 28.5 55 11 28 55 19.5 27 41 62 59.5 39 39 41 16.5 29.5 53.5 39.5 16.5
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each subject completed two FAST blocks (Phase 3), a consistent and an inconsistent block. 
Table 3 shows the number of trials to criterion for each test block and the order in which the 
FAST blocks were administered. It was expected that a larger number of acquisition trials 
would be required for subjects to reach criterion on the inconsistent block compared to the 
consistent block. A Mann–Whitney U test indicated that there were no significant order effects 
observed in the data. That is, trial requirement differentials across the FAST blocks were not 
significantly different based on order (z = −0.442, p = .67, two- tailed).
Of the 18 subjects, 13 showed a faster rate of response function acquisition in the 
consistent block compared to the inconsistent block, as expected. Four subjects showed a 
small acquisition rate differential in the unexpected direction, while one subject (Subject 7) 
showed no acquisition differential across the FAST blocks. The mean differential in FAST 
block trial requirements in the expected direction was 27.1. In contrast, the mean 
differential in FAST block trial requirements in the unexpected direction was considerably 
smaller at −7.5, indicative of the expected FAST effect at the group level.
Table 3
Number of Trials Required to Reach the Fluency Criterion Across Each of Two Blocks 
of the FAST (Phase 3)
Subject 1 3 4 5 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Inconsistent 
Block 88 60 40 20 22 25 32 15 43 40 10 76 23 47 32 100 22 22
Consistent 
Block 15 41 10 16 22 10 24 12 48 28 12 26 30 10 20 17 16 38
Difference 73 19 30 4 0 15 8 3 −5 12 −2 50 −7 37 12 83 6 −16
Order 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
Note. The order in which the two test blocks were administered is also indicated (1 indicates that 
the inconsistent block was administered first, whereas 2 indicates that the consistent block was 
administered first).
A Wilcoxon signed ranks tests was performed on the acquisition rate data during the two 
FAST blocks. The acquisition rate differential across the FAST blocks was found to be 
significant (z = −2.580, p = .005, one- tailed), indicating a strong FAST effect at the group level.
In order to quantify the magnitude of each subject’s own fluency differential in 
response class acquisition across the FAST blocks, we employed a simple Strength of 
Relation (SoR) Index. This was calculated for each subject by subtracting the number of 
trials required to complete the consistent block of the FAST from the total number of trials 
required to complete the inconsistent block of the FAST, and dividing this differential by 
the mean number of trials required by that subject to reach criterion during the baseline 
blocks. In effect, the SoR index can be used here as a measure of the strength of the A1–B1 
stimulus matching response, insofar as each subject’s acquisition rate differentials across 
FAST blocks is adjusted by a factor representing their own unique baseline acquisition 
rates for such task types. larger positive SoR indices indicate higher strength stimulus 
relations (i.e., A1–B1 stimulus matching responses are fast to acquire and are more 
resistant to disruption by competing reinforcement contingencies), while zero or negative 
responses indicate absent or reversed FAST effects (i.e., A1–B1 relations are slow to 
acquire and are more easily disrupted by competing reinforcement contingencies).
Table 4
Strength of Relation [SoR] Indices 
Subject 1 3 4 5 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
[SoR] 2.56 0.35 2.73 0.14 0 0.77 0.3 0.07 −0.08 0.2 −0.01 1.28 −0.17 2.24 0.41 1.55 0.152 0.97
Note. Larger numbers indicate stronger A1–B1 stimulus matching responses (i.e., stimulus relations). 
Negative numbers indicate a reversal of the expected acquisition rate differential across FAST 
blocks (i.e., a reversed FAST effect).
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Table 4 shows that for the majority of subjects, the FAST produced positive 
identifications of a history of A1–B1 training (i.e., it was sensitive to the subjects’ histories 
of relating A1 and B1). That is, positive SoR indices were calculated for 13 of the 18 
subjects. This table also shows that where SoR indices were negative, indicating a reversed 
acquisition rate differential across the FAST blocks, the magnitude of the index was small. 
In other words, the tendency is predominantly toward large positive SoR indices and small 
negative ones.
A one- sample Wilcoxon was also conducted to assess the significance of SoR index 
scores against zero. This analysis showed that SoR index scores differed significantly from 
zero in the expected positive direction (z = 2.580, p = .005, one- tailed), indicating a history 
of A1–B1 relational training for the subject group as a whole and a significant FAST effect.
The researchers then examined whether or not poorly established A–B relations 
during Phase 1 may partially account for those instances in which the predicted FAST 
effect was not observed. Some subjects who failed to show a FAST effect had required a 
large number of training trials (128, Subject 7, SoR = 0), while others who failed to show a 
FAST effect had required a smaller number (64, Subjects 12, 14, and 16). However, none of 
those who failed to show a FAST effect had completed the training in the minimal number 
of trials (32). It was suspected that requiring a larger number of training trials to complete 
simple conditional discrimination training may be indicative of poor stimulus control. In 
simple terms, the more training subjects required to pass Phase 1, the more likely it was 
that fortuitous forms of stimulus control (or mere chance- level choices during matching- 
to- sample tasks) controlled final performances. To check this idea, inferential correlational 
analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between the number of training trials 
required in Phase 1 and the final FAST effect. A Spearman’s rho analysis indicated that 
training trial number was moderately negatively correlated with the raw trial requirement 
differential across the FAST blocks (r = −0.495, n = 18, p = .018, one- tailed). Training trial 
number was also found to be moderately negatively correlated with the SoR index of the 
FAST effect (r = −0.439, n = 18, p = .034, one- tailed). Thus, more rapid acquisition of the 
baseline relations during Phase 1 was moderately associated with a larger FAST effect.
In summary, 13 out of 18 of the subjects showed the expected FAST effect. At a group 
level, subjects required significantly fewer training trials for consistent response classes to 
be established compared to inconsistent response classes. The SoR index also provided a 
statistically significant measure of preexisting stimulus–stimulus relations at the group 
level. Finally, rapid acquisition of baseline relations during Phase 1 was found to be 
moderately associated with larger FAST effects.
Discussion
The current study established that a FAST can be used to determine the preexistence 
of specific stimulus–stimulus relations at the group level. This result is broadly comparable 
with the types of group- level effects observed with other implicit tests. Thus, the current 
procedure might form the basis of a novel behavioral methodology for assessing the 
existence, and possibly the strength, of previously existing stimulus relations in the 
vernacular. In this regard, the FAST technique may prove useful to researchers wishing to 
assess stimulus relations using a simple and functionally transparent implicit testing- style 
methodology.
The FAST procedure may also be of use in an educational or research context in which 
the strength of a relational response may be of interest. At present, behavior analysts 
primarily utilize the transition from inaccurate to accurate responding (i.e., percentage 
correct) as the measure of matching response strength. However, several studies have used 
response times to measure relational responses at the level of conditional discrimination 
and derived relations (e.g., Bentall, Dickins, & Fox, 1993; O’Hora, Roche & Barnes- 
Holmes, 2002; Roche, linhehan, Ward, Dymond, & Rehfeldt, 2004; Steele & Hayes, 1991; 
Wulfert & Hayes, 1988) because speed of responding has been shown to be a valid index 
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for differentiating response strengths when response accuracy has stabilized (Johnson & 
layng, 1992; see also Spencer & Chase, 1996). The FAST method allows for the 
assessment of a matching response in contexts, in which, using traditional accuracy or 
response time criteria alone, the matching response is either already at maximum strength 
or not at sufficient strength to be considered established. In effect, the procedure would 
allow for the concurrent assessment of a matching response repertoire, even as the very 
repertoire is emerging or even after it has reached maximum accuracy. Measuring the 
ongoing emergence of relations in terms of relation strength may be useful when 
individuals display slow learning curves and where even slight improvements in relational 
responding are of interest. In the context of implicit testing, the FAST method would allow 
for an analysis of verbal relations between stimuli that have not yet emerged at sufficient 
strength in the repertoire of the subject (i.e., emerging racist forms of speech) to be 
discriminated by either the subject or an observer, or recorded reliably using accuracy- 
based measures.
The FAST procedure lived up to its name in the current experiment by generating the 
predicted effect within a matter of a few minutes. While the number of trials delivered to 
each subject is variable by design, a typical FAST, including the administration of two 
baseline blocks, required approximately 5 minutes to complete (this time does not include 
the time taken to establish the target A–B stimulus relations, a procedure which is 
unnecessary when using the FAST to assess preexisting, real- world stimulus relations). 
This is considerably less time than is required to complete another behavior analytic test; 
the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes- Holmes, Barnes- Holmes 
et al., 2010). The IRAP is an exhaustive test for the varieties of stimulus relations that 
obtain between exemplars of a complex verbal stimulus relation. In contrast, the FAST is 
intended as a rapid and easily administered “litmus test” for the existence and possibly 
strength of a specific stimulus relation between two verbal stimuli. It is important to point 
out, therefore, that there is a trade- off to be made between speed of administration and 
depth of analysis when choosing between a FAST and an IRAP procedure.
The variation in learning rates across the two baseline exposures and across individual 
subject’s FAST effects is a cause for concern. This instability in the baseline block data is 
not due to practice effects, which would have been evidenced by systematic decreases in 
trial requirements from Baseline 1 to Baseline 2. Further research is required to identify 
the source of this variation, which may have partly contributed to the reversal of the 
predicted FAST effect for four of the subjects. Of course, one might suggest that the most 
parsimonious explanation for the observed behavioral variation is that the FAST effect is 
superimposed by natural “noise.” However, this sort of explanation will not suffice for 
behavior analysts interested in identifying a source of behavioral variability for its 
own sake.
Response stability might be improved by several exposures to individual baseline 
blocks at the outset of a testing session. These blocks could function not only as additional 
baseline measures but as practice blocks leading to behavioral stability before the crucial 
FAST blocks are administered. It is important to remember, however, that despite this 
apparently random variability, predicted effects still emerged across the two key FAST 
blocks in the current study. Thus, any reduced variability in FAST block performance 
achieved in future research would likely serve only to enhance the FAST effect rather than 
diminish it.
Reduced response windows may also aid in increasing behavioral stability. This idea 
can easily be tested empirically. However, the current data and other published studies 
suggest that such a modification to the FAST may be fruitful. First, response latency data 
in the current study suggested that most responses occurred within 2,000 ms. In effect, the 
response window of 3,000 ms was not a pressing constraint on response speed. Second, 
while not directly comparable, other studies have successfully employed short response 
windows in IAT preparations (e.g., 200 ms; Verschuere, Prati, & De Houwer, 2009) to 
restrict conscious response strategies. In one priming study in which single stimuli were 
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presented individually, as in the FAST, a response window of only 600 ms was employed 
(Degner, 2009).
One means by which the procedural implicitness of the FAST may be enhanced in 
real- world contexts is by increasing the number of exemplars employed to assess the 
relations between verbal categories. For instance, several exemplars of positive words 
might be used in the place of the target category label “fun” to assess the relation between 
mathematics and fun. These exemplars would be employed interchangeably across trials in 
the FAST blocks. Irrelevant stimuli might also be employed as distractors to reduce the 
probability of subjects identifying the relations of interest. It is important to understand, 
however, that this would serve only to improve procedural implicitness. Such measures 
cannot help us to determine whether or not a subject was previously aware of the relations 
under analysis (i.e., outcome implicitness). In fact, in the current study, we can assume that 
subjects were aware of the A1–B1 relations under analysis, because this was trained and 
tested explicitly during the conditional discrimination training phase. Further research is 
required in order to determine if untrained or derived (unconscious) relations between 
experimental stimuli can be detected using the FAST procedure. This would determine 
whether or not the FAST procedure achieves both procedural and outcome implicitness.
There is a potential confound present in the current study with regard to what are 
known as “salience asymmetries” (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004) across the test stimuli. 
Specifically, the conditional discrimination training may have produced differences in 
subjects’ levels of familiarity with the A and B stimuli compared to the novel nonsense 
syllables employed as N1 and N2 control stimuli. It is possible that subjects responded to a 
fortuitous functional equivalence between the A and B stimuli on the grounds that they 
shared a history of simply being recognizable. Indeed, familiarity of stimuli has been 
shown to accelerate the acquisition of stimulus equivalence classes (Holth & Arntzen, 
1998). In contrast, the novel nonsense syllables denoted as N1 and N2 share their relative 
novelty. These asymmetries alone might help to account for the observed effects, although 
we see this as unlikely. Further research should involve the use of control blocks to 
eliminate the problem of salience asymmetry. For instance, in one control block, A1 and 
B2 (rather than A1 and B1) might share a response function, while in the other block, A1 
and N2 would share a response function. We would predict that acquisition of a common 
response function for A1 and B2 would be significantly slower than for A1 and N1. This 
outcome would indicate that A1 and B2 were nonequivalent, despite being equally familiar 
to subjects. A more thorough examination of the issue would involve engineering equal 
levels of familiarity across all experimental stimuli prior to the critical testing phases. It is 
important to remember, however, that in the current context, even if stimulus salience 
alone were to be the only feature controlling the A1–B1 relation, this would not take from 
the fact the FAST procedure was sensitive to this relation. unknown salience asymmetries 
only pose a problem when researchers make claims regarding the preexperimental 
associations existing between real- world stimuli. Nevertheless, if the FAST procedure is to 
be employed in real-world settings, its susceptibility to salience asymmetries must be 
assessed in further research.
One important challenge for any behavioral test is for it to allow for the discrimination 
of effects at the level of the individual. In other words, a test such as the FAST should be 
able to identify a history of stimulus relations for each individual subject. While group- 
level effects were strong in the current study, the FAST failed to identify the stimulus 
relation histories of four individuals, who, in fact, showed the reverse effect. It was 
promising that these reversed effects were among the smallest in the data set, strongly 
suggesting that they were based on uncontrolled, low- level variability rather than on pure 
randomness (i.e., no control). Nevertheless, nothing short of 100% predictive validity must 
be sought in future research if the processes analyzed in the current study are to be fully 
understood. Achieving that will be no easy task, especially when one considers that such 
levels of predictive validity have not yet been achieved by even the most mature implicit 
tests. Nevertheless, given that the analysis of stimulus control and behavioral variability 
521FuNCTION ACquISITION SPeeD TeST
are the stock in trade of the behavior analyst, we are well positioned to produce a test with 
near perfect predictive validity, based upon the behavioral processes explicated in the 
current study. It should be remembered, however, that while the authors do not view the 
FAST as a psychometric test (i.e., measuring an internal trait), the test will nevertheless 
display psychometric properties that should be explicated across research studies so that 
informative comparisons can be made between it and more commonly used tests such as 
the IAT (see Fiedler et al., 2006, for reliability and validity criteria an implicit test 
should meet).
The issue of comparing the FAST to other implicit test procedures is relevant to the 
matter of the validity of the SoR index, employed here to quantify strength of relations 
between test stimuli. Specifically, it could be suggested that in the wider field of implicit 
testing, such a scoring method, may not satisfy popular normative assumptions. That is, 
raw data from blocks of implicit tests are usually normalized in some way, although this 
very fact has been met with criticism from behavior analysts (Gavin et al., 2008, 2012; 
Ridgeway et al., 2010) and social cognitivists (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006). The most 
common method is to calculate z scores, following trimming of the raw data set to remove 
outlying data points and outlying overall subjects (this method is common to both the IAT 
and IRAP). This procedure will of course stabilize data and increase p values and effect 
sizes using Cohen’s (1988) criteria. Behavior analysts are normally wary of such statistical 
treatments because the purpose of data- cleaning procedures is to create data stability post 
hoc rather than through improved stimulus control measures. It is for this reason that the 
SoR index employed here does not involve data normalization, in the usual sense, but 
nevertheless corrects raw acquisition rate differences across test blocks by a factor 
representing the individual subject’s fluency at that particular task type (i.e., the untreated 
baseline acquisition rate). Thus, while this technique does not constitute data normalization 
in the usual sense, it is important to understand that it was not intended to. Nevertheless, 
the fact still remains that some researchers may wish to compare the FAST effects with 
those derived from other preparations, such as the IAT or IRAP, both of which employ 
normalized difference score (i.e., across test blocks) algorithms to quantify test effects 
(e.g., Greenwald et al., 2003). It is difficult to say at present how FAST effects might 
compare to those derived using other procedures and scoring systems.
An important asset of the FAST procedure is that it provides a nonrelative measure of 
stimulus relations. That is, it allows us to test the existence and possibly the strength of a 
relation between a target word and any other word, without needing to also measure 
relations to control words for comparison purposes (e.g., an IAT might assess that for a 
group of subjects Black goes with Bad to a greater extent than White goes with Bad). In 
this regard, it is a preferable technique to the IAT. While nonrelative measures are also 
provided by the Go/No- Go association task (GNAT: Nosek & Banaji, 2001) and the IRAP 
(Barnes- Holmes, Barnes- Holmes, et al., 2010), the current method also has the advantage 
in that it can provide a single index of relation strength that can be used for comparative 
purposes across research studies.
Because the FAST assesses the association between only two stimuli, it is more 
specific than most other implicit measures. Furthermore, because there is only one relevant 
association under analysis, no assumptions need to be made regarding how a number of 
specific associations are weighted against each other. Such assumptions have proved 
problematic for the IAT, in which up to four associations between two concepts and two 
attribute categories are assumed to contribute to the observed effect (Blanton, Jaccard, 
Gonzales, & Christie, 2006).
The high degree of stimulus- specificity in the FAST raises the possibility that, in real- 
world settings, using real words as stimuli, test effects may rest to some extent upon the 
representativeness of the stimuli chosen for the target categories of interest. For instance, an 
IAT designed to assess relations between African American names and negative words will 
produce slightly different results depending on the stimuli chosen for this purpose. This 
problem is known as the “stimulus specificity problem” (see De Houwer, 2001, for a 
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distinction between a relevant and an irrelevant feature account). The IAT employs multiple 
exemplars of the stimulus categories of interest (e.g., typically, approximately eight 
exemplars from each category are employed interchangeably across trials), but the key 
category labels (e.g., the term African American) cannot be used as target stimuli because 
they are used in the response rules presented concurrently onscreen. Thus, the IAT suffers 
from the problem of stimulus specificity, while at the same time partially controlling for it 
by using multiple exemplars to represent the stimulus categories of interest. The FAST, 
however, is suited to the use of category labels as target stimuli, a strategy suggested by 
Steffens, Kirschbaum, and Glados (2008) to deal with the very problem of stimulus 
specificity. However, although, using category labels as target stimuli increases the 
specificity of the test and conclusions derived from results, it might compromise procedural 
implicitness by potentially alerting subjects to the categories of interest.
The FAST procedure improves upon the implicitness of other popular measures, 
through its use of a nonassociative methodology. The use of this methodology also 
challenges popular associative accounts of implicit test effects popular in the cognitive and 
social-cognitive literature. Before we outline these potentially important issues, we will 
explain what we mean by an associative methodology.
Popular implicit tests almost universally depend on the contiguous presentation of two 
stimuli of interest on screen in the form of a rule (e.g., the IAT) or in sequence (e.g., 
affective priming tasks). This association is manipulated across trial types in order to 
assess the existence or strength of the preexisting association (or relation) between these 
two stimuli. In the IAT, for instance, the rule “Press left for Bad and African American” 
during one block of testing may be changed to “Press left for Good and African American” 
in a subsequent block. The manipulation of this association (e.g., the simultaneous 
presentation of Bad or Good and African American) is the basis of the response- time 
differential observed across task blocks. In effect, an association is created between pairs 
of stimuli in different configurations to assess their compatibility with assumed preexisting 
“mental associations” (see De Houwer, 2006).
As another example, the affective priming technique involves the presentation of 
target stimuli immediately following affective prime stimuli (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, 
& Kardes, 1986). Subjects are required to rapidly classify these target stimuli. These 
classification responses are in turn influenced by the nature of the prime. For instance, if 
the prime and target are affectively compatible in the subject’s history (e.g., Bad and 
African American), then reduced response times are observed for the identification of the 
target (i.e., greater response fluency). If, however, the prime and target are affectively 
incompatible (e.g., Good and African American), response latencies are elongated. As with 
the IAT, stimulus pairs in affective priming tasks are presented in an associative manner, 
and implicit knowledge is inferred from response differentials across different association 
configurations. Several other common procedures, such as the emotional Stroop (see 
Williams et al., 1988), the Go/No- Go association test (Nosek & Banaji, 2001) and the 
Extrinsic Affective Simon Test (EAST; De Houwer, 2003) employ comparable associative 
methodologies.
The main disadvantage of associative methodologies in popular implicit tests is that 
such a procedure provides an opportunity for subjects to discriminate the very relations 
under analysis (e.g., that between African American and Good or Bad). Behavior can 
therefore either become subject to social desirability, or subjects may even succeed at a 
response- faking attempt (e.g., purposely respond in error or more slowly during one trial 
block). In simple terms, if two category labels, or exemplars of categories of interest, are 
presented contiguously to a subject, it is likely that many subjects will become aware of the 
verbal relations or associations of interest to the researcher. This compromises the 
indirectness or procedural implicitness of the methodology.
IAT research has highlighted the need for improved procedurally implicit measures. 
Specifically, while it was formerly thought that the IAT was relatively impervious to 
faking attempts by the subject (Kim, 2003), it now appears that faking attempts by subjects 
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are more successful on subsequent exposures to the test (Steffens, 2004) and when novel 
stimuli rather than familiar words are employed (De Houwer, Beckers, & Moors, 2007). 
Indeed, the susceptibility of the IAT to faking is now generally higher than previously 
suspected (see Greenwald, Poehlman, uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009), and several studies have 
examined the compromises suffered by the IAT as a result of conscious faking efforts (e.g., 
Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005). Given this, any test feature that reduces the opportunity to 
discriminate the relations under analysis (i.e., improves procedural implicitness) is a 
welcome contribution to the literature.
The FAST procedure achieves increased procedural implicitness by presenting only 
single stimuli in the absence of rules or any instructions involving the target stimuli. 
Trial- by- trial response reinforcement alone controls responding to stimuli, and only the 
reinforcement contingencies are manipulated across test blocks. Thus, by employing a 
nonassociative methodology, the FAST procedure greatly reduces the opportunity for 
subjects to discriminate the purpose of the test, thereby enhancing its procedural 
implicitness. Interestingly, recent research has found that the use of a response window, 
as employed in the current FAST procedure, may also protect against faking attempts by 
subjects (Verschuere et al., 2009). More specifically, even if a subject becomes aware of 
the core process of the test, the subject cannot easily alter response time and accuracy 
when under a strict time constraint. Parenthetically, this recent realization among social 
cognitivists that enforced response fluency should replace or complement instructions to 
subjects to “go fast” parallels repeated calls for such an emphasis in the behavior analytic 
literature (see Gavin, Roche, & Ruiz, 2008; Gavin, Roche, Ruiz, Hogan, & O’Reilly, 
2012; Ridgeway et al., 2010; Roche et al., 2005; see also Barnes- Holmes, Murphy, et al., 
2010).
The recently developed Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure also has 
nonassociative stimulus presentation features, insofar as subjects are presented with 
complex contextually controlled relations rather than simple stimulus pairings (Hughes, 
Barnes- Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011). For instance, a racial bias IRAP might involve 
presenting the words Black and Bad on a computer screen simultaneously and require 
subjects to respond to these stimuli as relationally compatible or incompatible, as 
instructed. While the contiguous relation between the target stimuli is not manipulated, as 
it typically is in associative methodologies, the response requirements (i.e., the instructions) 
are. This feature has implications for the nature of the associations being assessed by 
implicit tests of that kind. That is, it challenges the popular assumption that implicit tests 
measure only simple, direct associations in memory rather than syllogisms, indirect 
knowledge or propositional knowledge (see Hughes et al., 2011). Propositional knowledge 
is usually often assumed to be assessed more readily using explicit measures, such as 
paper- and- pencil tests. Nevertheless, the IRAP’s nonassociative procedure does not 
improve upon the procedural implicitness of more popular implicit tests. That is, because 
of the simultaneous presentation of target stimuli on screen and in instructions, subjects 
may still easily discriminate the relations under analysis in the test.
The foregoing also raises the interesting conceptual issues regarding the types of 
stimulus associations being assessed by the FAST. Because the FAST procedure does not 
present stimulus pairs contiguously or contingently, test effects challenge the usual 
explanatory mechanism provided in social-cognitive terms. That is, most implicit test 
researchers assume that associative methodologies are required in implicit tests because it 
is precisely these types of associations that one would wish to activate in memory (see 
Mitchell, De Houwer, & lovibond, 2009). Test features, such as instructed time pressure, 
ensure that spontaneous and automatic (nonconscious) responding occurs that is controlled 
by these primitive mental associations. However, the FAST procedure cannot be easily 
viewed as activating mental associations in the usual way. While the current study did 
involve the creation of simple stimulus associations during matching- to- sample training, 
stimulus pairs were never presented in the FAST in any contiguous or contingent manner, 
and there were no instructions presented at any stage in which the target stimuli were 
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referred to. Of course, an interpretive mediational cognitive account can always be easily 
constructed. One possibility, for instance, is that the conditional discrimination training 
established associations between A1 and B1 that lead to each evoking mental 
representations of the other during the FAST. Thus, A1 and B1 may each have become a 
cue for performing the response required in the presence of the other. In the consistent 
FAST block, this process may have facilitated the function training, whereas in the 
inconsistent block it may have militated against it, thereby explaining the overall test 
effect (see Hall et al., 2003, for precisely such an account). Of course, while acceptable to 
those of a cognitive persuasion, this account is entirely speculative and is not fitting with 
the behavior analytic perspective adopted by the current research (see also Hughes et al., 
2011; Smyth, Barnes- Holmes, & Barnes- Holmes, 2008).
Other common interpretive explanations applied to the IAT, and potentially applicable 
to the FAST, appeal to sources of control that are more amenable to functional analysis. 
For instance, IAT effects are sometimes explained in terms of S- R incongruency (e.g., the 
same response for negatively evaluated mathematics and positively evaluated fun; 
De Houwer, 2001), or the trial- to- trial inertia effect of stimulus feature- response 
associations, their inhibition in case of interference, and the subsequent carryover of 
inhibition (Klauer & Mierke, 2005). These are all theoretical views informed by a 
fundamentally cognitive perspective but which may point to important stimulus control 
issues amenable to study in the behavioral laboratory. These various cognitive accounts 
notwithstanding, the important point from our perspective is that the FAST effects 
observed in the current study are also easily amenable to a behavioral analysis in terms of 
competing contingencies over relational responding, as offered in the original behavioral 
model of the IAT (see Gavin et al., 2008). It is important to note that no recourse to mental 
associations or similar cognitive accounts seems required (even if preferred) to explain the 
current data. In effect, the reliance of the FAST on well- understood behavioral principles, 
and its employment of simple scoring techniques with face validity (i.e., the SoR index), 
circumvent the need to appeal to hypothetical constructs and processes in explaining the 
current effects. Thus, rather than concern ourselves with matters of what types of assumed 
and hypothetical mental associations (associative or propositional) actually produced the 
current effects, we will focus in subsequent studies on the controlling variables that 
produced these test outcomes and thereby circumvent such debate altogether.
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